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Abstract 
 
We study a sample of individuals in 20 European countries that includes eight East European 
countries in order to identify whether these eight countries differ from the Western countries 
in the popularity of right-wing populist parties once we have controlled for personal 
attributes. The results show variation among the East European countries while as a whole 
they are not distinct from Western Europe. In particular, in Hungary and Poland populist 
right-wing parties enjoy greater support once account is taken of personal attributes. We 
discuss the reasons for this finding. When it comes to the personal idendities, we find that a 
right-wing identity, a negative view of immigrants, not being satisfied with democracy, being 
negative on homosexuality, and mistrust in both the national and the European parliament 
seem to be the factors heavily correlated with voting for a right-wing populist party in 
Europe. Men are more likely to vote for a right-wing populist party as are the old and the less 
educated. Having experienced unemployed also increased the probability of voting for these 
parties.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to use individual-level survey data to describe broad patterns and 
regularities in political attitudes towards right-wing populism, defined as the electoral success 
of populist Right-Wing (PRW) parties in the European Economic Area (EEA) between 2002 
and 2014.
1
 We choice to focus on the right-wing parties rather than left-wing populist parties 
due to the former’s more sceptical view of the European Union (EU) and immigration, which 
makes them a greater threat to the future of the EU. We focus on both personal values, 
economic factors and country of residence. We include nine Eastern European countries and 
explore whether they differ fundamentally from the Western European ones. Our main 
empirical question is whether the Eastern European nations are distinct in terms of values 
when it comes to vote for populist right-wing parties because of their communist heritage or 
whether economic growth and a higher standard of living has made their value system close 
to what we find in Western Europe once account is taken of the attributes of individuals. 
We control for several individual characteristics, including values. We focus on trust in 
both domestic and EU institutions; placement on the left/right scale and satisfaction with 
democracy as representing confidence in the political establishment. Traditional values are 
measured with attitudes towards homosexuals and immigrants and religiosity. Then there is 
the placement in the income distribution and whether the individual belongs to a minority 
group as well as his level of education. Personal attributes also involve gender and age and 
finally there is the important economic factor whether the individual has ever been 
unemployed for three months or more. What remains to explain is captured by country 
dummy variables and an objective of the paper is to compare this dummy between individual 
Eastern European nations and between Eastern European nations, on the one hand, and the 
Western European ones, on the other hand. 
The main innovation of the paper over those surveyed in the following section is to 
include Eastern European nations, nations that turn out to be quite diverse in their propensity 
to vote for populist parties. The attitudes and voting patterns of these nations are important 
for the decision making within the European Union (EU) and it is of some interest to see 
whether they share a populist sentiment, which may disrupt the operations of the EU. These 
nations share the experience of having had communist societies that involved central 
planning, absence of democracy and limited human rights in the form of freedom of 
                                                     
1
 The European Economic Area includes the member states of the European Union as well as Norway, Iceland 
and Lichtenstein. The latter have to abide by the rules of the single market but cannot participate in making 
these rules. Moreover, they are not a part of the monetary union nor the Common Agricultural Policy. 
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expression and freedom of movement. They may also have enjoyed more economic security 
since unemployment did not exist and education and health care were free of charge in the 
communist states. This shared history may make these nations more or less prone to vote for 
populist right-wing parties, which then affects collective decision making at the EU level. 
The question whether the economic development that has taken place is linked with changes 
in values, making them similar to those in the West or whether the cultural heritage of these 
societies, such as that left by communism, are still dominant. 
 
1. Literature 
The Brexit referendum in the UK in June 2016 as well as the election of Donald Trumps as 
President of the US has generated an intense interest in the reasons for the success of populist 
politicians and parties. Below we will give a brief overview of some recent contributions. 
 
2.1 What is populism?  
According to the political scientist Cass Mudde (see Mudde, 2016), populist parties tend to 
challenge prevailing elites and institutions such as the media, universities, mainstream 
political parties and international organisations.
2
 Populists also tend to share a tendency to 
claim to represent the “people” against the prevailing authorities and institutions and to be led 
by charismatic leaders. It follows that the populist parties tend to disregard the rights of 
minorities and even challenge the rule of law.  
We are interested in exploring to what extent economic and cultural factors may fuel the 
emergence of populist parties, in particular the lingering effects of a communist past. 
Ingelhart and Norris (2016) propose two explanations for the rise of populism. The first is 
based on economic factors that create insecurity such as international trade. The other is 
based on opposition to progressive, or socio-liberal, values, such as feminism and 
environmentalism. They use the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey to identify the ideological 
location of 268 political parties in 31 countries – the EU member states and Norway, 
Switzerland and Turkey – and use the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002-2014 to test 
whether it is economic insecurity or cultural factors that predict voting for populist parties. 
They control for gender, age and education, experience of unemployment, measures of 
feeling of income security and values that were meant to separate populist and liberal values. 
Their regression model that pools responses to the European Social Survey conducted from 
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 For a review of the literature on populism, see Mudde and Katwesser (2017). 
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2002 to 2014 tests the two hypotheses and finds more evidence for the cultural hypothesis. 
This would lead us to believe that past economic systems may have a long-lasting effect on 
values and attitudes in a country.
3
  
 
2.2 Values and trust as a state variable 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) use data from three waves of the World Values Survey, including 
65 countries and 75 percent of the world’s population and find evidence for economic 
development affecting cultural values as well as some persistence of distinctive cultural 
traditions. Economic development is found to be associated with shifts from absolute norms 
and values toward values that are more rational, tolerant, trusting and participatory. This 
supports what in sociology is called the modernization theory.
4
 However, cultural values do 
not only respond to economic development but are persistent so that the cultural heritage of a 
society – be it in the form of a religion or economic system – leaves an imprint on values that 
endure in spite of increased economic development. These cross-country differences – that is 
cross-cultural differences – are transmitted from one generation to the next through schools 
and the media. Inglehart and Baker mention the emergence of fundamentalist Islam as an 
example of the persistence of cultural heritage in spite of economic development. Another 
example is given by Fukuyama (1995) who argued that societies that suffer from low levels 
of trust are at a competitive disadvantage in global markets because of the difficulties of 
developing large and complex institutions, such as corporations.  
 
2.3 The lingering effects of communism 
Communism may have a lingering effect on values and attitudes. According to Inglehart, and 
Baker the former communist societies have more traditional values than Protestant European 
Union nations, the latter leaning away from the traditional values and towards self-expression 
values. They also find that the Catholic societies of Eastern Europe form a sub-cluster of the 
Catholic world between the West European Catholic societies and the Orthodox societies. 
The collapse of communism in the early 1990s brought about changes in recent decades. 
Following German unification and the fall of the Soviet Union both the former West 
Germany and the former East Germany experienced a change towards rational values and an 
                                                     
3
 However, in a more recent paper, Guiso et al. (2017) argue that Ingelhart and Norris fail to take into account 
the decision by voters to abstain from voting rather than voting for populist parties. They find that a 
combination of the inability of governments to guarantee security has shaken confidence in traditional political 
parties and institutions, increasing fear beyond that already created by trade and migration. 
4
 See Bell (1973, 1976). 
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emphasis on self-expression and away from traditional values. Another example is mentioned 
by Inglehart and Baker, which is that East Germany is much closer to the ex-communist 
countries of the Czech Republic and the Baltic States than West Germany in terms of 
“traditional/secular” versus “self-expression” values. Thus, the cultural heritage of a country 
appears to matter, in this case their communist past.  
 
2.4 Populism and trade 
Economic shocks, trade and crises have an effect on values and political development. There 
is a rapidly growing literature on the effect of trade on values, in particular the vote for 
populist parties. Clearly, a populist party that is nativist and anti-establishment may oppose 
free trade as recent examples show. The negative income and employment effects of trade 
may affect subgroups of the labour force as demonstrated in a rapidly growing literature that 
shows how international trade is having a negative effect on local economies. Pessoa (2014) 
finds that workers in the UK in industries that became exposed to Chinese import 
competition earned significantly less over the period 2000-2007 because of fewer years of 
employment and lower hourly earnings while employed. The economic effects of import 
competition can also have political effects by creating protectionist sentiments and increase 
the share of voters of populist parties. Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015) find an effect of 
trade-integration with China and Eastern Europe on voting in Germany from 1987-2009. The 
vote share of extreme-right parties responds significantly to trade integration measured by 
changes in manufacturing employment. Curtice (2016) studies public attitudes to the 
European Union in Britain and finds concerns about the cultural consequences of EU 
membership but that voters are inclined to think that membership is economically beneficial. 
Colantone and Stanig (2016) study voting patterns in Western Europe and find that voters in 
Western Europe in areas more exposed to competition from Chinese imports tend to vote in a 
more protectionist and nationalist direction.  
 
2.5 Populism and economic cycles  
Yann et al. (2017) find a relationship between increases in unemployment and voting for 
populist parties. Moreover, they find a correlation between the increase in unemployment and 
a decline in trust in national and European political institutions. Overall, these authors find 
that crisis-driven economic insecurity is a driver of populism and political distrust. Frieden 
(2016) uses data from Eurobarometer surveys since 2004 to explore changes in attitudes 
before and after the recent crisis. He found that the crisis reduced trust in both national 
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governments as well as the EU. He also found that less educated and less skilled citizens, 
along with the unemployed, are particularly lacking in trust; and that those in the southern 
periphery – the debtor nations – are uniformly disappointed with their national political 
institutions. The UK is again an outlier in terms of lack of trust towards the EU. In another 
recent paper, Foster and Frieden (2017) analyse the responses individuals in Eurobarometer 
surveys conducted from 2004 to 2015, to study the reasons for changes in trust during the 
recent financial crisis. The authors confirm the results of previous studies that the better 
educated have the highest levels of trust in both their national governments and the EU, while 
those with lower levels of skills and education have less trust. Economic variables, such as 
unemployment, help explain the variation in trust among Europeans over time and across 
countries.  
In a recent paper, Dustmann et al. (2017) find that growth in GDP per capita increases 
support for European integration, and trust in both European and national parliaments, while 
an increase in the unemployment rate have a negative effect on these same variables. The 
economic situation matters more in regions where people have traditional and autocratic 
values. Political populism is associated with less trust in parliamentary institutions and more 
Euroscepticism. Therefore adverse macroeconomic shocks tend to increase the demand for 
populist political parties. They find that the effect of macroeconomic shocks is almost twice 
as large on trust towards national as compared to trust towards the European parliament. 
Thus, citizens blame national politicians more than their European counterparts for adverse 
economic conditions. These authors conclude that anti-EU sentiment is more sensitive to 
national identity and personal attributes than economic factors so that future economic 
growth will not fully restore support for the European Union. The UK is again clearly an 
outlier in terms of lack of trust towards the EU and falling trust in recent years in this study. 
 
2.6 Populism and financial crises 
Financial crises tend to reduce trust in societies and have a greater effect on voters than 
ordinary recessions. Hence it is possible that they also reduce trust in domestic institutions, 
political parties and international institutions. Funke et al. (2016) study election data for 20 
developed economies going back to the year 1870 and find that polarization rises following 
financial crises and that voters seem to move towards right-wing populist parties. Hernandez 
and Kreisi (2016) reach similar conclusions in their study of election outcomes in 30 
European countries in the two elections that preceded the latest crisis and the one that 
followed. They find that falling output, increased unemployment and increased debt resulted 
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in losses for incumbent parties in Western Europe, but less so in Central and Eastern Europe. 
There is also the study of Bartels (2014) who found in a sample of 42 elections in 28 OECD 
countries before and after the Great Recession that 1% growth of GDP increased the voting 
share of the incumbent party by 1.2%.  
 
2.7 Populism and the welfare state 
The emergence of populism in the wake of economic recessions and financial crises may be 
prevented by the creation of a welfare state. Swank and Betz (2003) analysed national 
elections in 16 European countries from 1981-1988 and found that a welfare state weakens 
the link between international trade and immigration, on the one hand, and support for the 
populist right, on the other hand. Mayda et al. (2007) found that the population tends to be 
less risk averse when it comes to international trade in small countries with higher levels of 
government expenditures. Finally, Rodrik (1998) argued that since governments can reduce 
aggregate risk through redistribution and also by providing a stable provision of publicly 
provided goods and services there was a tendency for more open economies to have larger 
governments.  
 
2 Populist parties 
We are interested in the propensity of individuals and nations to vote populist right-wing 
parties (PRW) into power. Table 1 lists all PRW-parties found in 20 countries contained in 
the dataset.
5
 Their election results in the most recent parliamentary elections in 2002 and 
2014 are also listed, showing an increase in support in 14 out of 20 countries.
6
 Hungary tops 
the list in terms of the share of votes in 2014 and the increase from 2002. There is also a 
PRW party in Greece that did not exist in 2002 and had a vote share of 20.5% in 2014. In 
third place, there is Finland where the “True Finns” have around a fifth of the voting share. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Sweden comes next with the Swedish Democrats having a vote of 
12.9%. After Poland we have Bulgaria, Austria, and Lithuania. At the bottom of the list is 
Italy where the Lega Nord lost many votes during this period. Just above Italy, we have 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, France, Estonia, and Denmark. Germany and the UK are 
close to the centre of the list. 
                                                     
5
 The classification of the parties is based on Balcere (2011), Bakker et al. (2015), Bornschier (2010), Inglehart 
and Norris (2016), Minkenberg (2002), Minkenberg (2015), Mölder (2011), and Wodak et al. (2013). 
6
 We note that some countries do not have a right-wing populist party using our definition, such as Spain, 
Iceland, and Ireland. These were omitted from our sample. 
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Table 1. Populist parties in different countries 
 
Country Party name 2002 % 
(last 
election) 
2014 % 
(last 
election) 
Change 
Hungary Fidesz,                                                                                 
Jobbik (new) 
41.1 69.4 28.3 
Poland Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS),                     
Kongres Nowej Prawicy (KNP) (new) 
9.5 31.0 21.5 
Greece Anexartitoi Ellines (ANEL) (new),                                                          
Chrysí Avgí,                                                  
LAOS 
- 20.5 20.5 
Finland Perussuomalaiset (PS) 1.0 19.0 18.0 
Sweden Sverigedemokraterna (SD) (new) - 12.9 12.9 
Bulgaria Ataka (AT) (new),                                      
Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie (IMRO)  
3.6 11.8 8.2 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) 10.1 17.5 7.4 
Lithuania Partija tvarka ir teisingumas (PTT) (new) - 7.3 7.3 
Czech R. Úsvit (new) - 6.9 6.9 
Germany Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (new), 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(NPD) 
0.1 6.0 5.9 
U.K. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) (new) - 3.1 3.1 
Slovakia Slovenská národná strana (SNSk),                                   
Kotleba (new) 
3.3 6.1 2.8 
France Front National (FNf) 11.1 13.6 2.5 
Norway Fremskrittspartiet (FRP) 14.6 16.3 1.7 
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti (DF) 12.0 12.3 0.3 
Slovenia Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka (SNSi) 4.4 2.2 -2.2 
Estonia Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE) 2.4 0.0 -2.4 
Netherl. Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) (new),                 
Pim Fortuyn (PM),                                 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) 
18.7 12.2 -6.5 
Belgium Vlaams Belang (VB),                                                     
Front National (FNb) 
11.3 3.7 -7.6 
Italy Alleanza Nazionale (AN),                                                
Lega Nord (LN) 
16.0 4.1 -11.9 
 
Note: The table shows the support for each party in the last parliamentary election in 2014 or before that year 
compared to the last parliamentary election in 2002. Hence, some of the results are from a year preceding 2014 
or 2002. Source: European Election Database.  
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3 Explanatory variables 
Our data comes from the European Social Survey (ESS) and contains answers from 
individuals in 20 member countries of the EEA between 2002 and 2014, 11 Western 
European countries and nine Eastern European countries. The ESS is carried out every two 
years, measuring the attitudes and behavioural patterns for more than 295,000 persons in 
various European countries. We use 140,920 observations from the survey.  
The names and definition of selected variables are listed in Table 2.
7
 The names of the 
variables are those from the EES with an N_ added to indicate the normalisation from 0 to 1. 
The dependent variable, pop, takes the value 1 if an individual voted for a PRW-party in the 
last election, but 0 otherwise. Variables meant to capture cultural traits and trust in 
institutions are continuous variables taking a value between 0 and 1 except for the ones 
measuring religion. These are trust in the national parliament, trust in the EU Parliament, 
placement on the left/right scale of the political spectrum, satisfaction with democracy, 
attitude towards homosexuals, attitudes towards immigrants and place in the income 
distribution. Age is measured in the number of years at the time of the election. 
 There are several other dummy variables. These are not belonging to a minority group, 
gender (1 denoting females), having low education (secondary school or less), middle level or 
tertiary education and a dummy for those who have been unemployed for 3 months or more.
8
 
In addition, we have three dummy variables for respondent not being religious, being 
somewhat religious or being highly religious. Finally, there is a dummy variable for each 
country and each wave of the European Social Survey, starting in 2002. 
 
 
                                                     
7
 See appendix for exact definitions and sources. 
8
 The ESS changed its units of measurement for self-placement in the income distribution after their third survey 
in 2006. In order to account for that difference, the answers before and after the change were normalized.  
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Table 2. Definition of variables 
 
Source: European Social Survey. 
 
 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
Pop is a dependent variable which only takes the values 0 and 1, so it does not follow a 
normal distribution. Therefore, a regression by least squares would produce the wrong 
standard errors. Running a logistic regression would counter this problem, but the 
interpretation of the coefficients would be more complicated. Therefore, we choose to use a 
least-squares regression in order to simplify the interpretation, even though the standard 
errors for the estimated coefficients might be wrong. We try to account for this problem by 
running a generalised least-squares regression and using heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in the table below. In order to account for unequal inclusion probabilities in 
the survey and differences in the countries’ population size, post-stratification and population 
weights provided by the ESS are used. The weighted dataset is considered as a random 
sample of the European population. The Variance Inflation factors (VIF) for each variable 
revealed that the model contained little multicollinearity.  
The generic estimation equation is given by: 
  
Dependent variable: Variable takes value 1 for:  
Pop Voted for a PRW-party  
Continuous (0-1) variables Description Meaning of variable’s highest value 
N_trstprl Trust in national parliament Complete trust  
N_trstep Trust in EU Parliament Complete trust 
N_lrscale Placement on left/right scale Identify as far-right 
N_stfdem Satisfaction with democracy Very satisfied 
N_freehms Attitude towards homosexuals Very negative 
N_imwbcnt1 Attitude towards immigrants Very positive  
Income dist. Placement in income distribution In the top 10% of the distribution 
Age Age at the time of interview  
Dummy variables Variable takes value 1 for:  
Low-Relig Being not so religious  
Mid-Relig Being somewhat religious  
High-Relig Being highly religious  
Not belonging to minority Not belonging to a minority group  
Gender Female   
Low-Educ Having less than lower secondary education 
Mid-Educ Having secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education 
High-Educ Having tertiary education  
Unemploym  Having at some time been unemployed for 3 months 
Country Country of interview  
Round Period of the interview  
10 
 
where  takes the value 1 if the individual voted for a PRW party; X is a matrix with the 
values and attitudes variables and religion listed in Table 2, Z has the demographic and 
economic variables (age, income distribution, education, gender, unemployment, minority 
group),  has the years of interview dummies, and  are country dummies.  
Table 3 shows the regression results for the cultural and demographic variables along 
with their significance and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The coefficients of 
the country and time dummy variables are shown in the following Table 4. The analysis of 
the full model contains 140,920 observations, as 90,256 observations were dropped due to 
one or more missing variables.  
The coefficients of the independent variables are mostly as predicted. A right-wing 
identity, a negative view of immigrants, not being satisfied with democracy, being negative 
towards homosexuality, and mistrust in institutions seem to be the factors heavily correlated 
with voting for a PRW party. In addition, women are less likely to vote for these parties, as 
are the young while the low- and mid-level educated are more likely to vote for them 
compared to the highly educated. Having no experience of being unemployed for at least 
three months in the past makes one less likely to vote for a PRW party. Thus those with an 
experience of unemployment are more likely to vote for the PRW parties. 
The only perhaps puzzling result is that individuals are more likely to vote for these 
parties if they place themselves higher in the income distribution. There is also the question 
why people with “medium religiosity” are less likely to vote for a PRW party than the group 
of low and high religious respondents. 
The coefficients of the normalised values variables can be compared since the variables 
all take values from zero to one. The largest coefficient is that of being right-wing, there are 
the coefficients of disliking immigrants, distrusting democracy and not trusting the European 
parliament. Other coefficients are smaller but show that disliking homosexuals is likely to 
make people vote for the PRW parties as well as not trusting the national parliament. Thus the 
typical voter of a PRW party is an older male with experience of unemployment, leaning to 
the right along the political spectrum, and feeling threatened by immigrants, not trusting 
democracy and the EU and disliking homosexuals. Somewhat surprisingly, he is not low 
income according to our estimates. 
 
11 
 
 
Table 3. OLS Regression with sample weights. Dependent variable: Pop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Significant at 95% confidence level, ** significant at 99% confidence level, *** significant at 99.5% 
confidence level. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the coefficients of the country and ESS-round dummy variables. The time 
dummies show that the support of PRW parties increased between 2008 and 2010 following 
the world financial crisis and also between 2012 and 2014, which can possibly be attributed 
to the euro crisis. There was also an increase between 2004 and 2006, which is more difficult 
to explain. 
Comparing the Eastern and Western European nations, the average value of the dummy 
variable for the 11 West European nations is -0.011 while the average for the nine East 
Europan nations is around zero (0.0007 to be precise). So on average, the Eastern Eurpean 
nations have a slightly larger country effect. However, there is variation within the group.  
Hungary has the largest country dummy coefficient, followed by Norway, and Poland while 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, United Kingdom, Greece, Slovakia, and Germany have the 
lowest dummies. Both Hungary and Poland were in the top half of Table 1, but Finland, 
Variables Coef. Est. 
Std. 
Error 
T-value   
Intercept 0.0160 0.006 2.55 * 
Trust in national parliament -0.0144 0.005 -3.19 ** 
Trust in EU Parliament -0.0264 0.004 -6.23 *** 
Placement on left/right scale 0.1300 0.004 28.95 *** 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.0291 0.004 -7.30 *** 
Attitude towards homosexuals 0.0119 0.004 3.31 *** 
Attitude towards immigrants -0.0445 0.004 -11.23 *** 
Placement in income distribution 0.0072 0.003 2.43 * 
Age 0.0002 0.000 5.50 *** 
Low religiosity Reference Dummy 
  Medium religiosity -0.0066 0.002 -3.70 *** 
High religiosity 0.0020 0.002 1.07 N.S. 
Does not belong to a minority group -0.0034 0.003 -1.14 N.S. 
Female -0.0064 0.002 -4.19 *** 
LowEduc Reference Dummy 
  MidEduc 0.0055 0.002 2.71 ** 
HighEduc -0.0043 0.002 -2.28 * 
Has not ever been unemployed for 3 
months -0.0035 0.002 -2.03 * 
12 
 
Greece, and Sweden, also at the top of that table, have negative coefficients in Table 4, which 
suggests that the explanatory variables account for the populist sentiments in these countries. 
 
            Table 4. OLS Regression with sample weights. Dependent variable: Pop 
 
Dummy variables Coef. Est.        Std. Error t-value   
Austria Reference Dummy   
Belgium -0,010 0,004 -2,31 * 
Bulgaria -0,036 0,006 -5,57 *** 
Croatia -0,041 0,007 -5,63 *** 
Czech Rep. -0,068 0,004 -16,69 *** 
Denmark 0,035 0,005 6,96 *** 
Estonia -0,067 0,004 -15,47 *** 
Finland -0,015 0,004 -3,65 *** 
France -0,017 0,005 -3,82 *** 
Germany -0,047 0,004 -12,41 *** 
Greece -0,047 0,004 -10,63 *** 
Hungary 0,258 0,009 29,53 *** 
Italy -0,025 0,006 -4,38 *** 
Lithuania -0,021 0,007 -2,88 ** 
Netherlands -0,020 0,004 -4,77 *** 
Norway 0,109 0,006 18,38 *** 
Poland 0,061 0,005 11,94 *** 
Slovenia -0,036 0,004 -8,17 *** 
Slovakia -0,044 0,005 -8,80 *** 
Sweden       -0,032        0,004           -7,93 *** 
United Kingdom        -0,052        0,004         -13,10 *** 
Round 1: 2002         
Round 2: 2004 0,001 0,002 0,52 N.S. 
Round 3: 2006 0,029 0,002 12,76 *** 
Round 4: 2008 0,021 0,002 10,61 *** 
Round 5: 2010 0,031 0,002 13,80 *** 
Round 6: 2012 0,033 0,002 14,29 *** 
Round 7: 2014 0,050 0,003 18,36 *** 
Degrees of Freedom:  140.920 . = signific. at 90% conf. lvl 
(90,256 observations deleted  
due to lack of observations) 
* = signific. at 95% conf. lvl 
Residual Standard Error: 0,186 ** = signific. at 99% conf. lvl 
Multiple R-Squared 12,85 *** = signific. at 99.5% conf. lvl 
Adjusted R-Squared 12,82     
F-Statistic: 155,9     
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors     
Generalised least-squares regression and using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Note that two Eastern European countries – Hungary and Poland – rank high in Table 1 
and also have large positive coefficients of the country dummies in Table 4. The other 
Eastern European countries; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia,  
Slovenia, and Slovakia have negative country dummies, which indicates that time-constant 
country-specific factors are not pulling them in that direction. The average value for Eastern 
Europe when Hungary and Poland are omitted is -0.045, that is to say more negative than the 
average for the Western European countries. 
We conclude that it is only in Hungary and Poland among the Eastern European nations 
that voters are inclined to vote for PRW parties once account has been taken of their 
individual values, age, gender, education and religion. 
 
5. Specificities of Eastern Europe 
Results in the existing literature would suggest that the socio-economic environment in 
Eastern European countries is conducive to the emergence and electoral success of populist 
political movements, in particular right-wing parties. For example, Inglehart and Norris 
(2016) suggest that countries that have been exposed to major economic displacement and 
change, along with countries whose culture is traditional and conservative, tend to have larger 
electoral base for populist right-wing parties. Eastern Europe seems to qualify on both 
dimensions. Yet, reality happens to be very different. 
Eastern European countries are small or medium open economies that largely depend on 
international markets, in particular European markets, for both essential inputs and the sale of 
their final or intermediate products. Since the fall of the Soviet bloc they have been the 
recipients of major foreign direct investment and in turn have experienced at least one major 
episode of capital flight in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Moreover, the 
structure of their economies, dependent on traditional heavy and light industry, has exposed 
Eastern European countries to strong competitive pressures as a result of the entry of China in 
the World Trade Organization. In combination, these factors have contributed to a rise in 
inequality on a number of dimensions: rural vs. urban areas, declining vs. emerging or 
growing industries, young vs. old generations, etc.  
I addition, Eastern Europe also had to go through a painful transition from central 
planning to market- and price-based economic coordination. Eastern European countries vary 
considerably in the speed, dynamics, and success of their transition, but there are several 
common features across the region. The economic changes have led to a substantial growth in 
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inequality and economic displacement. Another source of social tension and bitterness is that 
in all countries, abuse of political power and influence has often given rise to abuse of market 
power. For these reasons, it is still rare that incumbents become reelected. Thus, Eastern 
Europe has been exposed to economic pressures that are at least as severe as those facing old 
EU member states. 
The conservative culture and prevailing social norms in Eastern European societies also 
suggest that the advance and popularisation of social-liberal ideas and policies would 
provoke a political backlash. Dustmann et al. (2017) show how traditional values magnify the 
effect of economic downturns on voters – make them distrust the European Union and 
national parliaments more and vote for populist parties. Due to the relatively late transition to 
modernity and the influence of the Soviet bloc, Eastern Europeans were subject to more 
traditional and conservative standards of behaviour in society and in the family. Furthermore, 
for somewhat complex reasons, education and the mass media before 1989 emphasized 
patriotism and even nationalism as opposed to internationalism. Also, as pointed out by 
Baker and Inglehart (2000) Eastern European cultures and social norms up to the 2000s are 
strikingly oriented towards social survival and cohesion rather than self-expression.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern European countries have experienced major 
social and cultural changes: the elimination of national borders, the reduction of national 
sovereignty, the emigration and immigration of a great number of people, increase in the 
social acceptability of cohabitation without marriage, abortion, same sex relations and even 
marriage, etc. In other words, these societies have experienced convergence to beliefs and 
norms in Western Europe with an emphasis on the individual and self-expression rather than 
on some sort of a collective identity. In such circumstances of major and fast changes, one 
would expect that there would be cultural frictions and opposition that may prove beneficial 
to the growth of right-wing parties.  
Yet, our results do not lend support to those hypotheses: They show that Eastern 
European countries are not more susceptible to right-wing populism than Western European 
countries. We believe that several factors may account for some of the discrepancy between 
what prior research would suggest and the estimated country effects. One of these factors is 
the turbulent history of the region and in particular its turbulent relation with nationalism. On 
the one hand, the spread of nationalism from Western Europe to Eastern Europe is largely 
responsible for the creation of national identities in the region, which eventually led to the 
demise of the four great empires of the East; the Ottoman, the Russian, the Habsburg and the 
German. The final result was the establishment of the modern nation states of the region by 
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the end of WWI. The whole process, however, turned out to be particularly violent and 
destructive: Both WWI and WWII were much bloodier and socially more disruptive in the 
East than in the West. Moreover, the events of the 20
th
 century emphasize a key political 
feature of the region: Namely, economic, political and cultural life in the region is caught up 
in the interplay of Great Powers, specifcially Germany and Russia, which cannot be opposed 
by any single regional nation state. For example, Germany became a major export market and 
creditor for most Eastern European countries in the 1930s. As a result, long before WWII, the 
Nazis used the resulting economic influence to promote their political agenda. Naturally, 
since their inception all nation states in the region have been actively looking for allies and 
forms of international cooperation with various degrees of success in order to offset and limit 
the impact of foreign interference in their own affairs.  
In this context, both the Cold War and WWII remain a constant reminders what happens 
when chauvinism runs rampant and Eastern Euopean countries fail to form strong 
international alliances. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, membership in NATO and the 
European Union have been the two pillars of the foreign policy of all Eastern European 
countries and they have enjoyed wide public support precisely because of the traumatic 
memories of the past. It is important to point out that even the most extreme Euroskeptics in 
Hungary and Poland, for example, do not question the value of membership in NATO or the 
EU. Instead, they defend traditional social values, the preservations of the idea of Europe of 
the nations rather than a federal Europe.  
Other factors that limit the susceptibility of Eastern Europeans to right-wing populism are 
socio-economic in their origin. Many Eastern Europeans are aware that they have directly or 
indirectly benefited from the common EU market, mainly through foreign FDI and the 
opening of Western European markets to Eastern European labor. In addition, the opening of 
the borders has meant an increase in travel and interaction with other Europeans, 
intermarriages, and much a greater awareness of ‘the other.’ In this context, the electoral map 
of Poland is revealing. Eastern Poland has been and still remains the stronghold of right-wing 
populism, while Western Poland has been much less susceptible to right-wing ideas and 
much more prone to vote on the basis of economic issues. This does not seem to be a 
coincidence given the increasing cross-border integration of Western Poland with Germany, 
the great reallocation of people, mainly Poles across the border, and the influx of FDI to the 
region.  
Last but not least, while Eastern Europeans may exhibit fear and unwillingness to accept 
immigrants from non-European or non-Christian countries, they seem to have no issues with 
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the immigration of Western European to their countries for economic and family reasons. 
Also, this acceptance of greater European social and economic integration can be traced back 
to a residual belief that some Western European countries, in particular Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries, and their peoples, remain role models that should be emulated. Last 
but not least, the Eastern European countries have a checkered state and institutional 
tradition. Thus, the alternative to European integration appears to the general public much 
less attractive than in some old European great powers, such as the UK, France, or Germany. 
Relatedly, political interests in Eastern Europe are not institutionalised through political 
parties, and political parties represent clusters around certain influential political leaders. 
Consequently, while authoritarian tendencies may very well be present and even accepted by 
much of the electorate, right-wing populists in Eastern Europe simply do not have the 
institutional capacity to impose total (itarian) control on political, economic, and cultural life.  
 
6. What makes Hungary and Poland different? 
On most dimensions, Hungary and Poland appear similar to most other Eastern European 
countries. In what follows, we explore possible explanations for the high susceptibility of 
Hungarians and Poles to right-wing populism. We believe that the observed patterns can be 
accounted for by a combination of traditional culture, strong nationalist tradition, and 
extremely ethnically homogenous population. We suggest that the Europeans in less 
ethnically homogenous societies are less prone to support right-wing populism not only 
because exposure to immigrants and minorities somehow makes them more enlightened. 
Rather, we believe that ethnic diversity and migration makes everyone aware of the 
economic, political and social difficulties before the implementation of a right-wing 
nationalist agenda. In this sense, ethnic diversity undermines the credibility of right-wing 
policies. 
Poland and Hungary experienced high rates of economic growth in the 2000s and the 
2010s. Moreover, they did not do worse than the rest of the Eastern or Western European 
countries during and after the Great Recession. In fact, Poland is the only European country 
that did not experience even a technical recession following the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
While the public finances of Hungary are still a cause for concern, the Hungarian economy 
has also done reasonably well during the same period. In this context, it is all the more 
surprising that these two countries have heavily turned to the extreme right in the recent 
decade or so.  
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Another puzzling aspect is that both countries, despite some media coverage, have not 
borne the brunt of the migrant crisis after 2013. Poland has stayed completely away from the 
main channels of immigration from the Middle East and Africa to the EU, while Hungary 
was only briefly a transit destination in 2015-2016. Even during this period, the influx of 
temporary immigrants to Hungary pales in comparison with the state of affairs in Greece and 
Italy. Consequently, unlike in the case of Germany, it does not appear likely that the rise of 
right-wing populism can be traced back to the increase in immigration to the EU after the 
Arab Spring.  
In terms of standard explanations, Poland and Hunagry stand out for their traditional 
culture and social norms. Inglehart and Baker (2000) show that Poland and Hunagry, along 
with Romania, are the Eastern European countries with the most traditional and conservative 
social norms and attitudes. It comes as no surprise, then, that large sections of these societies 
have felt deeply uncomfortable with the rise of social liberalism. These developments have 
certainly contributed to the popularity of political parties that appear to defend the certainty 
of established institutions, such as the church, the state, or established social norms based on 
(patriarchal) hierarchy, order, and the value of the community as opposed to individual 
expression. Nevertheless, one is bound to ask why other societies that score high on the same 
index of traditionalism of Inglehart and Baker (2000), such as Romania, have not experienced 
a similar rise in right-wing populism. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that both Poland and Hungary have had a long 
historical tradition as regional powers. While it is true that by 1815 both countries became 
parts of the multinational Russian and Habsburg empires, their intellectual and political elites 
largely survived intact and, in turn, these Eastern European countries were the first to develop 
a very strong sense of national identity. The strength and popular nature of Polish and 
Hungarian nationalism is evident, for example, from the Polish rebellions of 1830-1, 1846, 
1848-9, 1863-4 and the Hungarian revolution of 1848-9. The resistance to Soviet rule and 
interference after 1945 also bears a strong flavour of national resistance against the 
successors of the traditional imperial enemy.  
There are also other ‘old’ Eastern European countries, but their historical tradition has 
either been interrupted by long foreign rule and socio-economic dominance, as in the case of 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Lithuania and Serbia, or the current states are the union of older 
states with distinct historical tradition, as is the case of Romania. For example, among the 
other Eastern European countries, Czechia and Romania also have histories that can be traced 
back at least to the Middle Ages through the kingdom of Bohemia, and the principalities of 
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Walachia and Moldova, respectively. Still, the Czech lands experienced sustained 
Germanization after 1620 characterized by strong influence of the central government of the 
Habsburgs and of the local German aristocracy. Thus, the Czech national revival only picked 
up pace in the 19
th
 century. Similarly, historical differences between Walachia, Moldova and 
Transylvania slowed down the formation of a Romanian identity during the 19
th
 century.  
The only dimension on which Hungary and Poland are completely different from the rest 
of the Eastern European countries, and in fact from most Western European countries, is their 
ethnic homogeneity. As regional powers, both Hungary and Poland have ruled over other 
nations up until the 18
th
 and the 19
th
 century. After WWI, however, Hungary lost all regions 
with mixed populations under the formal jurisdiction of Austria-Hungary. While, Poland after 
1920 included sizeable Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and German minorities, the end of WWII saw 
the creation of a displaced to the West but largely homogeneous nation state. The result is 
that by the early 1990s, ethnic Hungarians accounted for 98 percent of the population of 
Hungary, while ethnic Poles accounted for 97 percent of the population of Poland. In this 
respect, the only Western European countries with similar dominance of the major ethnic 
groups are Norway and Finland. Both of them also turn out in our statistical tests to be 
susceptible to right-wing nationalism. 
We investigate further this issue in Figure 1 by plotting the relationship between the 
estimated country-specific susceptibility to right-wing populism and the share of dominant 
ethnic groups in the population. A visual inspection of Figure 1 confirms that the tendency to 
support right-wing populism does not increase in the ethnic diversity of a country. This 
finding contradicts the notion that ethnic differences increase social tension and the 
probability of civil conflict on their own. To the contrary, we find that the propensity to 
support right-wing populist parties increases in the ethnic homogeneity of the country both in 
Eastern and Western Europe. A linear regression of the susceptibility to right-wing populism 
on the share of the dominant ethnic groups shows a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between the two variables. Moreover, Figure 1 suggests that support for right-
wing populism may be growing exponentially in the share of the dominant ethnic groups.  
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Figure 1. Relationship between country-specific susceptibility to right-wing populism and the share of dominant 
ethnic groups in the population. Sources: Table 4 and National statistical bureaus.  
 
 
We suggest two hypotheses for the observed pattern. First, it may be that interacting a lot 
with people of diverse background in daily life makes it harder to demonize ‘the other’ as the 
source of all social evils. Thus, ethnic diversity may actually promote the (liberal) notion of 
common human nature and, in turn, universal human rights. Along with this optimistic 
hypothesis, we also consider a second hypothesis that ethnic diversity does not promote 
mutual understanding but its existence increases the costs and dangers associated with 
promoting right-wing policies. In ethnically diverse societies, potential sympathizers are 
practically aware that the implementation of right-wing nationalistic and populist policies is 
likely to increase social tension, cause social disruption, and lead to international isolation, if 
not intervention by more powerful neighbours. The practical difficulties in getting such 
policies through in diverse societies may actually undermine the electoral credibility of right-
wing populism. We leave it to future research to test which of these hypotheses hold.  
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7. Conclusions  
We have discovered that the Eastern European nations differ internally in their propensity to 
vote for a PRW party. They have a slightly higher average country effect but vary greatly 
internally. Thus Hungary and Poland have a greater affinity with such parties while the 
Baltics, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia have much less. But we can also find 
comparable countries in Western Europe such as Norway and Denmark, which also are 
inclined to vote for a PRW party. Poland and Hungary are both former regional powers with 
homogenous populations where individual politicians are powerful rather than organised 
parties as in the West. We argue that the diversity of the population of other Eastern 
European countries makes their culture more liberal; that is more accepting of other ethnic 
group and less prone to vote for right-wing populists. 
The coefficients of the personal attributes have a familiar pattern. A right-wing identity, a 
negative view of immigrants, not being satisfied with democracy, being negative on 
homosexuality, and mistrust in institutions seem to be the factors heavily correlated with 
voting for a PRW party. In addition, women are less likely to vote for these parties, as are the 
young and the better educated. Having the experience of being unemployed for at least three 
months in the past makes one more likely to vote for a PRW party. The only surprising result 
is that individuals are more likely to vote for these parties if they place themselves higher in 
the income distribution. There is also the question why people with “medium religiosity” are 
less likely to vote for a PRW party than the group of low- and highly religious respondents. 
One limitation of the study is that some political parties which are not considered PRW 
may have adopted more radical policies to win votes from PRW parties. Therefore, overall 
populism support could be underestimated. The UK is a good example where the 
Conservative Party became more populist as a response to the challenge presented by the UK 
Independence Party. In fact, in the recent study by Dustmann et al. (2017) the Conservative 
Party is counted among populist parties based on its manifesto. 
We conclude that the supporters of free trade and immigration as embodied in the EU 
charters will have to address the concerns of the dissatisfied part of the population – older, 
less educated men with traditional values who fear the effect of immigration – as well as the 
apparently inherent or cultural nationalism in some member countries of the European Union.   
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Appendix 
The data and their sources 
 
 
Variable (continuous) Question asked in the survey Meaning of variable's highest value Name of variable in ESS
Trust in national parliament How much do you trust your county's parliament? Complete trust trstprl
Trust in EU Parliament How much do you trust the European Parliament? Complete trust trstep
Placement on left/right scale Where would you place yourself on the "left and right"-scale? Identify as far-right lrscale
Satisfaction with democracy How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country? Very satisfied stfdem
Attitude towards homosexuals Do you agree that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish? Refuses the statement freehms
Attitude towards immigrants Do you think that immigrants make your country a better or worse place to live in? A better place to live  in imwbcnt
Placement in income distribution Where is your household located in your country's income distribution? In the top 10% of the distribution hinctnt and hinctnta
Age How old are you? Oldest agea
Dummy Variables Question asked in the survey
Value=1 if the respondent answered
Name of variable in ESS
Low religiosity On the scale 0-10, how religious are you? 0-3 rlgdgr
Medium religiosity on the scale 0-10, how religious are you? 4-6 rlgdgr
High religiosity on the scale 0-10, how religious are you? 7-10 rlgdgr
Does not belong to a minority group Do you belong to a minority ethnic minority group in your country? Yes blgetmg
Female Are you male or female? Female gndr
LowEduc What is the highest level of education you have achieved? Lower secondary or less edulvla
MidEduc What is the highest level of education you have achieved? post-secondary, non-tertiary or less edulvla
HighEduc What is the highest level of education you have achieved? tertiary education edulvla
Has not ever been unemployed for 3 months Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period more than three months? No uemp3m  
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